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“A firm may not drop a client like a hot potato, especially if it is in
order to keep happy a far more lucrative client.”1  Like other similes, 
these words of Judge Ann Aldrich have proved both persuasive and 
obfuscating.  Many courts have relied on them in addressing claims that
a law firm seeks to manipulate conflict of interest rules for its own 
profit.  Yet the simile’s impact has tended to cloud analysis of the issues
it raises and has shifted attention from the purposes of conflicts of
interest rules to the motives of the lawyers. 
This essay, which boasts of being the first law review article devoted 
to what professional responsibility insiders call the “hot potato doctrine,” 
will discuss some of the unanswered questions about the doctrine’s core 
principle: a firm may not turn a present client into a former client by 
“firing” the client in order to get the benefit of the more lenient conflict
of interest rules that apply to former clients.  Exactly how does this 
modify the rules laid down by the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
governing conflicts of interest and withdrawal from representations? 
What is the justification for refusing to apply the former client conflict 
rule to someone who is, after all, a former client?  Should the doctrine be 
applied if it is the client who reacts to the conflict of interest by 
discharging the law firm, rather than the firm that withdraws?  Does it
matter if the firm dropped one client before accepting another, so that 
there has never been a time at which it represented two clients with 
conflicting interests?  Should the doctrine apply when the conflict has 
been brought about by a client rather than a lawyer or when the lawyers 
involved have done their best to avoid the conflict?  And when the 
doctrine does apply, which of the two clients whose interests conflict
should be the one to lose the services of the firm?
The subject of this discussion is one of the few to which my friend 
Fred Zacharias did not bring his insight and incredible energy.  So far as
I can tell, his many writings make only one passing reference to the
doctrine.2  But he did raise deep questions about conflict of interest 
rules.3  He also wrote illuminatingly about broad principles of 
professional responsibility that proclaim more than closer consideration 
1. Picker Int’l, Inc. v. Varian Assocs., 670 F. Supp. 1363, 1365 (N.D. Ohio 
1987), aff’d, 869 F.2d 578 (Fed. Cir. 1989).  The sentence in the text has been quoted in
many later opinions.
2. See Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Permissive Rules of Professional 
Conduct, 91 MINN. L. REV. 265, 287 (2006). 
3. See, e.g., Fred C. Zacharias, Coercing Clients: Can Lawyer Gatekeeping Rules 
Work?, 47 B.C. L. REV. 455 (2006); Fred C. Zacharias, Waiving Conflicts of Interest, 
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can justify4 or than can be enforced in the real world.5  And for all his 
interest in theory, he rejoiced in probing the details of professional
rules.6  So I hope that he would have appreciated this small contribution, 
written in his honor, to the field to which he devoted most of his 
professional life. 
II. THE DOCTRINE AND ITS RATIONALE 
We begin with the paradigm situation that the hot potato doctrine 
addresses.  Firm represents Potato, Inc. in ongoing tax matters.  Another 
corporation, Mammoth, Inc., retains Firm to bring a major antitrust suit, 
and it turns out that Potato, Inc. should be one of the defendants.  Firm
cannot, absent informed consent by both clients, represent Potato, Inc. in
one matter and sue it in another, even though the matters are wholly
unrelated and involve no overlapping confidential information.  That is 
the concurrent conflict rule presently embodied in Model Rule 
1.7(a)(1)’s ban on representing a client when “the representation of one 
client will be directly adverse to another client.”7 
The hot potato doctrine prevents Firm from escaping this rule by 
dropping Potato and thus turning it into a former client.  Normally, a law 
firm is free to represent a client against a former client so long as the 
matters in question are not substantially related.  Matters are substantially 
related, with possible rare exceptions, only when it is likely that confidential 
information the firm obtained while representing the former client can be
used against it in the present representation, or when the present
representation requires the firm to demolish what it accomplished in the 
4. See, e.g., Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 IOWA L. REV. 351 
(1989); Fred C. Zacharias, Specificity in Professional Responsibility Codes: Theory, 
Practice, and the Paradigm of Prosecutorial Ethics, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 223 
(1993); Fred C. Zacharias, The Preemployment Ethical Role of Lawyers: Are Lawyers
Really Fiduciaries?, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 569 (2007). 
5. See, e.g., Fred C. Zacharias, The Future Structure and Regulation of Law
Practice: Confronting Lies, Fictions, and False Paradigms in Legal Ethics Regulation, 
44 ARIZ. L. REV. 829 (2002). 
6. See, e.g., Green & Zacharias, supra note 2; Fred C. Zacharias, A Critical Look 
at Rules Governing Grand Jury Subpoenas of Attorneys, 76 MINN. L. REV. 917 (1992). 
7. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a)(1) (2010).  For earlier authority, 
see International Business Machines Corp. v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271 (3d Cir. 1978); Flatt 
v. Superior Court, 885 P.2d 950 (Cal. 1994); Grievance Committee v. Rottner, 203 A.2d 
82 (Conn. 1964); CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 351–52 (1986); and 
Thomas D. Morgan, Suing a Current Client, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1157 (1996), which



















   
    







previous one, for example, by invalidating a patent it helped the former 
client obtain.8  Under this rule, Firm would be free to represent
Mammoth in its suit against Potato after terminating its representation of 
Potato because the matters in which Firm represented Potato are entirely 
unrelated to the current antitrust suit.  But Potato can persuade the court
to disqualify Firm from representing Mammoth against it by arguing that 
Firm should not have dropped it like a hot potato, so that the concurrent 
representation rule applicable to present clients should still apply.9 
A.  The Doctrine and the Model Rules
The hot potato doctrine both builds on and modifies the Model Rules 
of Professional Conduct, providing an example of the interplay between
rulemakers and courts that until very recently has been central to the 
regulation of the bar.10  As just explained, the doctrine arises from
the discrepancy between the stringent disqualification rule barring
representations against a current client—Model Rule 1.7(a)—and the 
more lenient rule applicable to representations adverse to former
clients—Model Rule 1.9(a).  That discrepancy tempts some law firms to
turn a current representation into a past representation, and the hot potato 
doctrine guards against that temptation.  It would be interesting to
consider what other professional rules create similarly perverse
incentives, but not here.11 
8. See  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.9(a) & cmt. 3 (2010); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 132 (2000).  The rule is 
usually traced back to T.C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 113 F. Supp.
265, 268–69 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).  For its development, see WOLFRAM, supra note 7, at 
358–71.
9. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 132 & 
cmt. c (2000); RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN S. DZIENKOWSKI, PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY: A STUDENT’S GUIDE § 1.7-5 (2008).  There is a bit of contrary authority.
See, e.g., Monaghan v. SZS 33 Assocs., No. 89 Civ. 4900 (RWS), 1994 WL 623185 
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 1994); Pearson v. Singing River Med. Ctr., Inc., 757 F. Supp. 768 
(S.D. Miss. 1991); In re Dayco Corp. Derivative Sec. Litig., 102 F.R.D. 624 (S.D. Ohio 
1984).  In Texas, the concurrent representation rule is limited to substantially related
cases, so the problem does not arise.  See TEXAS DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 1.06(b) (2010). 
10. See John Leubsdorf, Legal Ethics Falls Apart, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 959, 965–69, 
1022–24, 1031–34 (2009); John Leubsdorf, Legal Malpractice and Professional
Responsibility, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 101, 106–08, 117–20 (1995). 
11. See, e.g., John Leubsdorf, Against Lawyer Retaining Liens, 72 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 849, 861–62 (2004) (explaining how lien discourages clients from letting lawyers 
possess documents and property); Carol M. Rice, The Superior Orders Defense in Legal 
Ethics: Sending the Wrong Message to Young Lawyers, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 887
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We should not forget that the discrepancy between the past and 
present conflict rules exposes clients to a contrary temptation.  By
claiming that a law firm still represents them in one matter, clients can
invoke the concurrent representation rule to prevent the firm from 
representing an adversary against them in another, unrelated matter.  For 
example, they can argue that the first matter has not been concluded and 
that, even if it has been, the firm has a continuing relationship with its
client, as opposed to representing it only in discrete matters.12  Some  
firms increase their clients’ temptation by leaving it unclear whether the 
end of a particular job is also the end of the representation as a whole, 
thus encouraging clients to continue regarding the firm as their lawyer, 
or at least to claim that they do.13 
Two more Model Rules lurk underneath the hot potato doctrine in
different ways.  The vicarious disqualification rule, by extending the 
prohibition of conflicting concurrent representations by an individual 
lawyer to every lawyer in that lawyer’s firm, ensures that the hot potato 
problem will be a recurring one for large firms.14  Not only will 
increasing size increase exponentially the possibilities of a conflict, but 
it will also pit against each other the firm’s department hoping to benefit 
from the new client and the department hoping to retain the old one.15 
Virtually all the reported hot potato cases involve firms that are both 
large and nationally known.  And in virtually all the cases, each
representation of the offending firm was handled by a different lawyer. 
12. See, e.g., SWS Fin. Fund A v. Salomon Bros., 790 F. Supp. 1392 (N.D. Ill.
1992) (finding continuing representation, but denying disqualification on other grounds); 
Artromick Int’l, Inc. v. Drustar, Inc., 134 F.R.D. 226, 229–32 (S.D. Ohio 1991) (finding
representation had ended); Manoir-Electroalloys Corp. v. Amalloy Corp., 711 F. Supp. 
188, 193–95 (D.N.J. 1989) (finding continuing representation). 
13. See SUSAN P. SHAPIRO, TANGLED LOYALTIES: CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN LEGAL 
PRACTICE 192–99 (2002); see also 26 ABA/BNA LAW. MANUAL PROF’L CONDUCT, 
Conflicts of Interest: Representation Adverse to Existing Client 512, 512–17 (2010)
(explaining that although most lawyers would prefer to leave the door open for former
clients to come back, the cost of being foreclosed from future representation in unrelated
matters adverse to clients who may never return should also be considered). 
14. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.10(a) (2010). 
15. See SHAPIRO, supra note 13, at 188–91 (describing ways of managing potential 
conflicts).  I owe this reference and some others to a law student paper, Henry M. Kelln, 
Dropping the Hot Potato: Rescusitating [sic] the Permissive Withdrawal Rules in the 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Berkeley Elec. Press, Working Paper No. 1164, 























That is why I refer to the entity whose professional conduct is in 
question as a firm, not a lawyer.16 
Lastly, Model Rule 1.16, specifying when a firm may or must
withdraw from a representation, seems to offer a way to resolve the hot 
potato problem without any need to create doctrine.17 After all, does not 
that rule tell us just when a firm may withdraw from a representation? 
As we shall soon see, things are not that simple.18  Nevertheless, that
lawyers are not free to withdraw from representations at will is one of
the rules giving rise to the hot potato problem.19 
Although based on the concurrent and past representation conflicts 
rules, the hot potato doctrine clearly modifies them by directing that, in 
some circumstances, the concurrent representation rule will govern even 
though one representation has ended.  This raises a central question
about the doctrine: once the concurrent representation specified by 
Model Rule 1.7(a) no longer exists, and the problems addressed by that 
rule have ended, why should the rule apply?  The answer to that question 
will not only determine whether the hot potato doctrine deserves to live 
but will surely influence its scope. 
The doctrine also modifies the model rules governing conflicts of 
interest by implementing the remedy of disqualification.  The Model 
Rules themselves specify only the remedy of lawyer discipline.20  I have
been able to find only two decisions invoking the hot potato doctrine to
discipline a lawyer.21  Motions to disqualify have been virtually the
exclusive forum for development of the doctrine.  It has consequently
been applied only in situations in which at least one of the representations
involves litigation.22  As a result, the doctrine is judge-made and has
therefore developed both flexibilities and inconsistencies.  An added 
16. See John Leubsdorf, Pluralizing the Client-Lawyer Relationship, 77 CORNELL 
L. REV. 825 (1992) (critiquing the tendency to think of ethics in terms of “the lawyer” 
and “the client” when these entities are often plural).
17. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16 (2010). 
18. See infra Part III(A). 
19. In France, a lawyer may always withdraw, provided that the client receives due 
notice.  ANDRÉ DAMIEN & HENRI ADER, RÈGLES DE LA PROFESSION D’AVOCAT § 91.11 
(10th ed. 2004). 
20. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. paras. 14, 19, 20, & R. 8.4 
(2010). 
21. See Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Winkel, 599 N.W.2d 456 (Iowa 1999)
(not using the phrase “hot potato”); In re Johnson, 2004 MT 6, 319 Mont. 188, 84 P.3d
637.  Likewise, there seem to be no reported decisions granting injunctive or damages 
relief for violations of the doctrine. 
22. See Maritrans GP Inc. v. Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz, 602 A.2d 1277 (Pa.
1992) (enjoining a firm that dropped an old client for a new one, but failing to apply the 
hot potato doctrine because the old and new representations were related); see also
Airgas, Inc. v. Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP, No. 10-612 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 3, 2010) 
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layer of flexibility results from authority in many jurisdictions providing 
that, even if the court finds that a law firm acted unprofessionally, it has 
discretion whether to require the firm to withdraw.23 
B.  Purposes of the Doctrine 
At least three untenable justifications for the hot potato doctrine come 
to mind.  First, although many of the conflict of interest rules protect 
clients against misuse of their confidences, that clearly could not justify 
the hot potato doctrine, which makes a difference only when the two
representations giving rise to the problem are unrelated in the sense that 
confidences received from one client have no use against the other.  If 
the two representations were related, rule 1.9(a) would bar the second
representation even if the first representation were long past, and there 
would hence be no need to invoke the concurrent representation rule.24 
Second, the assertion that firms may not drop one client like a hot
potato “in order to keep happy a far more lucrative client” suggests that
the doctrine targets lawyer greed.25 No doubt distaste for greed helps
explain why judges have imposed disqualification, but as a justification
it falls short.  If courts seek to step in whenever a lawyer acts out of 
greed, the hot potato doctrine will have to be placed on a huge menu of 
other new doctrines.  Our system of professional responsibility has never
forbidden the aspiration to become wealthy through the practice of law,
though we should honor those with other goals.26  Payment, of course, 
may not be sought through improper means, but that simply returns us to 
the question why dropping one client for the sake of another is 
sufficiently improper to warrant forbidding the new representation. 
23. See infra Part IV; see generally RICHARD E. FLAMM, LAWYER DISQUALIFICATION:
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AND OTHER BASES §§ 23–25 (2003 & Supp. 2010) (identifying 
and describing various lawyer disqualification standards). 
24. See, e.g., In re Compact Disc Minimum Advertised Price Antitrust Litig., No. 
MDL 1361, 2001 WL 243494, at *14 & n.8 (D. Me. Mar. 12, 2001) (disqualifying
counsel under prior client rule while observing that hot potato doctrine might also apply); 
Santacroce v. Neff, 134 F. Supp. 2d 366, 371–72 (D.N.J. 2001) (holding that even if
concurrent representation rule does not apply, the past representation rule requires 
disqualification); supra note 8.
25. Picker Int’l, Inc. v. Varian Assocs., 670 F. Supp. 1363, 1365 (N.D. Ohio 
1987), aff’d, 869 F.2d 578 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 
26. Cf.  JOHN LEUBSDORF, MAN IN HIS ORIGINAL DIGNITY: LEGAL ETHICS IN FRANCE


























Third, protecting “the integrity of the legal profession and its high 
standing in the community”27 likewise begs the question: why is the
integrity of the profession impaired when a firm applies the former client
rule to a former client?  Admittedly, there might be a problem if the firm
made a client into a former client through a forbidden withdrawal, but
the withdrawal rule not only allows but also requires withdrawal if
continuing the representation “will result in violation of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct” and that of course includes a violation of the 
conflict of interest rules.28 Once again, if the withdrawal is proper, why 
does a greedy motivation call for judicial relief?
A more persuasive justification for the doctrine looks away from the 
circumstances in which the firm left its old client—circumstances on 
which the phrase “drop a client like a hot potato”29 confusingly focuses 
our attention—to those in which the firm accepted its new client.  In the 
paradigm case we are considering,30 that acceptance violates the 
concurrent representation conflicts rule: the firm is undertaking to 
represent its new client in litigation against its existing client.31  For the
court to disqualify the firm from its new and unlawful representation can 
hence be justified as depriving it of the fruits of its violation, and 
deterring it and other firms from misbehaving similarly in the future. 
And relying on the unlawful new representation to establish a conflict of 
interest that the firm invokes as a reason to withdraw from the old
representation only aggravates the offense.
A significant deterrent is appropriate when the victimized client seeks
a remedy because in many instances no remedy will be sought.  Faced
with the desertion of its lawyers, the old client may simply wish them 
good riddance without trying to retain its faithless representatives or
undergoing the expense of legal proceedings.  This may happen before 
the firm even accepts the new client: simply telling the old client that it
wishes to represent an adversary may be sufficiently discouraging to 
induce the old client to remove the problem by granting a somewhat 
pressured consent.32  Indeed, with all respect for the difficulties of 
27. El Camino Res., Ltd. v. Huntington Nat’l Bank, 623 F. Supp. 2d 863, 883
(W.D. Mich. 2007) (quoting Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp. v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271, 283 (3d Cir. 
1978)); see also Argue v. David Davis Enters., No. 02-9521, 2004 WL 2480836 (E.D. 
Pa. Nov. 4, 2004) (invoking “public confidence in the judicial system”); Lemelson v.
Apple Computer, Inc., No. CV-N-92-665-HDM (PHA), 1993 WL 556452 (D. Nev. June 
2, 1993) (relying on similar language). 
28. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16(a)(1) (2010). 
29. Picker Int’l, 670 F. Supp. at 1365. 
30. See supra text accompanying note 7. 
31. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a)(1) (2010). 
32. Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.7(b) usually allows informed consent to
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switching lawyers, one might well suspect a client that insists on staying 
with a firm that wants to reject it, especially when the client simultaneously
seeks to disqualify the firm from another representation—this might be 
called the clinging potato problem.  Actually, the client will need to 
retain a new firm simply to press its challenge to the old firm, so the 
temptation will be all the greater to forgo the expense of seeking to 
recapture the latter. 
Alternatively, the firm may be able to avoid an attack on its conduct
by bringing old representations to an end, or persuading the old client— 
with more or less fidelity to its interests—to settle pending cases,
making it possible to accept the new client without any conflict of
interest.  The new client’s case may also settle before the conflicts issue 
is adjudicated.  And as already noted, lawyer discipline is unlikely in hot 
potato cases.33  So when a party does protest and the court finds a 
violation, sanctions of some vigor are appropriate. 
Aside from deterring violations, disqualification can sometimes be
justified as implementing the policies on which the concurrent representation 
rule is based.  One of those policies is that it is hard to trust and
cooperate with a firm that is simultaneously opposing one, even in an
unrelated matter.  Clients do not have an unbounded right to lawyer 
loyalty, and representing a client once does not bind a lawyer forever to
avoid acts offensive to the client.  But a client should not have to brace 
itself against direct and simultaneous opposition from its lawyer. 
Of course, once the lawyer drops the client, this problem disappears.
But is not the fear of being dropped in this way by a lawyer who then 
represents one’s adversary part of precisely the distrust against which the
concurrent representation rule guards?  If abandonment is allowed, will 
not the fear of abandonment contaminate the client-lawyer relationship
while it still exists, before the lawyer deserts the client? 
Less support for the hot potato doctrine can be gleaned from the other 
major policy underlying the concurrent representation conflict of interest
rule: the possibility that a firm will act with diminished vigor when 
representing a client who is suing the firm’s other client for fear that the 
See id. R. 1.7(b).  Compare In re Sandahl, 980 F.2d 1118 (7th Cir. 1992) (finding
informed consent), with El Camino Res., Ltd. v. Huntington Nat’l Bank, 623 F. Supp. 2d 
863 (W.D. Mich. 2007) (rejecting informed consent claim). 
33. See supra text accompanying note 21. 
259





















other client will discharge the firm.34  As Thomas Morgan has pointed 
out, this possibility does not exist for every client in every case.35  In the
paradigm case we are considering, Mammoth, Inc., the new client suing
Potato, Inc., might have some fear that Firm’s relationship with Potato 
might impede its representation of Mammoth—but Mammoth is not 
objecting.  Potato has no reason to fear that Firm will appease Mammoth
by giving Potato poor representation in wholly unrelated matters in
which Mammoth is not involved.  Yet the hot potato doctrine enables 
Potato to bar Firm’s representation of Mammoth. 
One can however argue that the very fact that Firm has “fired” Potato 
shows that its representation of Potato has indeed been impaired—in 
fact, impaired to the vanishing point.  The suffering comes not from any 
incentives brought to bear on Firm by its concurrent representations but 
rather from the conflict rule forbidding such representations.  So the
argument is a bit circular.  Nevertheless, so long as the concurrent 
representation rule exists in its current rigor, there is much to be said for
preventing Firm from attaining compliance at the expense of Potato, the 
very party that the rule seeks to protect. 
In sum, disqualifying a firm from representing its new client in the
paradigmatic hot potato situation can indeed be justified, primarily to
deter firms from accepting new representations in violation of the
concurrent representation rule.  The policies underlying that rule are also
implicated, albeit in complex and indirect ways.  Ultimately, it makes 
little sense to have a rule protecting a client from harms that may follow 
should its lawyers represent its adversary in an unrelated matter if the 
result will be to encourage lawyers to jettison entirely the client sought
to be protected.  The hot potato doctrine prevents that from happening.
III. BEYOND THE PARADIGM CASE: THE DOCTRINE’S BOUNDARIES 
Several features make the paradigm case we have so far been 
considering an easy one.  The firm in question has simultaneously 
represented two clients with opposing interests, in violation of the 
concurrent representation conflicts rule.  The firm unilaterally resolved 
the conflict by dropping the old client in the midst of the representation. 
And the conflict resulted from the firm’s own act in agreeing to
represent a new client against an existing client.  When we relax these
requirements, new problems sprout from the hot potato doctrine, which 
34. See, e.g., Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp. v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271, 280 (3d Cir. 1978);
Estates Theatres, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 345 F. Supp. 93, 99 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 128 cmt. e (2000). 
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indeed begins to look less like a single entity and more like a
heterogeneous salad. 
A.  What if the Firm Drops Its Old Client Before         
Accepting the New Client? 
If a firm terminates one of the two representations that would 
otherwise conflict before starting the other representation, there has 
never been a time at which it was in violation of the concurrent 
representation rule.  One could therefore argue that the firm has done 
nothing calling for a deterrent sanction.  Nor has there been a period 
during which the dangers that the concurrent representation rule seeks to 
avoid could have existed.  As a result, there is arguably no need to 
disqualify the firm from representing its new client. 
Before the hot potato simile appeared on the ethical menu, as well as
more recently, some courts applied a rule consistent with this argument, 
holding that whether the concurrent representation rule was violated 
should be judged as of the time the second representation commenced.36 
A withdrawal after that date was therefore governed by the concurrent 
representation rule,37 while a previous withdrawal left the firm
constrained only by the previous representation rule.38 
If unsupplemented, this approach has the disadvantage that it 
disregards the grounds on which the firm withdrew.  If the firm 
withdrew from its first representation without good cause and in breach
of its obligations, it acted improperly even if it did so before accepting a 
new client.  Disqualification is then appropriate, not to deter violation of 
the concurrent representation rule but to deter violation of the rule
prohibiting withdrawal without good cause.39  On the other hand, even if
a firm accepts the new client before withdrawing from representation of 
36. See, e.g., Ransburg Corp. v. Champion Spark Plug Co., 648 F. Supp. 
1040, 1043–45 (N.D. Ill. 1986). 
37. See, e.g., EEOC v. Orson H. Gygi Co., 749 F.2d 620, 621 (10th Cir. 1984); 
Unified Sewerage Agency v. Jelco Inc., 646 F.2d 1339, 1345 n.4 (9th Cir. 1981); Qwest
Corp. v. Anovian, Inc., No. C08-1715RSM, 2010 WL 1440765 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 8,
2010); Santacroce v. Neff, 134 F. Supp. 2d 366 (D.N.J. 2001) (alternate ground). 
38. See, e.g., Pamlab, L.L.C. v. Hi-Tech Pharmacal Co., No. 08-cv-00967-REB-
BNB, 2009 WL 77527 (D. Colo. Jan. 9, 2009) (relying on lack of evidence that lawyer
dropped old client to get new one); In re Agway, Inc., Bankruptcy Nos. 02-65872, 02-
65873, 02-65874, 02-65875, 02-65876, 02-65877, 2005 WL 3806043 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 
Dec. 9, 2005). 




   
 
 












    
  
the old one, disqualification is inappropriate if it had cause to withdraw 
other than the conflict of interest that the firm itself created.  For 
example, if the old client refuses after notice to pay its bills, the firm
should be free to withdraw; arguably it should also be free to continue
representing the new client despite having briefly engaged in a forbidden 
concurrent representation.40  The same may be true if the firm accepts 
the new client but then protects the old client’s interests by parting from 
the lawyers who have been representing that client so that they can 
continue their representation.41 
Geoffrey Hazard and his coauthors W. William Hodes and Peter Jarvis 
have proposed a modified time-of-discharge standard: retaining the hot
potato doctrine in its existing form when the firm withdraws after
improper concurrent representation has started, they would allow the
firm to withdraw before then but only if it has good cause to withdraw.42 
That good cause could not of course be the improper concurrent 
representation that the firm itself has created; there would be no such 
representation because the firm would have withdrawn from the old 
representation before starting the new one.  But there could be other 
grounds for withdrawal.  It might be that “withdrawal can be accomplished 
without material adverse effect on the interests of the client,” or that “the 
client insists upon taking action . . . with which the lawyer has a 
fundamental disagreement”—other than the action of objecting to the 
proposed conflicting representations—or that the representation “has
been rendered unreasonably difficult by the client,” or that there is 
“other good cause for withdrawal.”43 
As Hazard and his coauthors say in defense of this proposal, if the 
requirements for withdrawal are met, the rules “permit a lawyer to cease
representation—assuming no harm to the client—for no reason or 
because the lawyer is bored or overworked or because more lucrative
40. See Rosewood Apartments Corp. v. Perpignano, No. 99 Civ. 4226 (NRB)
(MHD), 2000 WL 145982 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2000); ROTUNDA & DZIENKOWSKI, supra
note 9, at 343; see also Eaton v. Coca-Cola Co., 640 F. Supp. 2d 203 (D. Conn. 2009) 
(stating that firm, having withdrawn from one representation, may also withdraw from 
other representation due to irrevocable breakdown of lawyer-client relationship).  On
nonpayment as a ground for withdrawal, see MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 
1.16(b)(5). 
41. See Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 721 F. Supp. 534 
(S.D.N.Y. 1989).  But see Atl. Pac. Home Loans, Inc. v. Superior Court, No. D048609, 
2006 WL 3616997 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 13, 2006) (upholding disqualification in somewhat 
similar circumstances). 
42. 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 20.10 (3d ed. 
2001 & Supp. 2010). 
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work presents itself.”44  So a greedy firm should be free to switch
clients—provided the matters in question are unrelated, the firm has
cause to withdraw from the first representation, and it does so before
starting the second representation. 
One difficulty with this proposal is that it makes a lot turn on the 
precise time of withdrawal.  If the firm does not succeed in effectuating 
its withdrawal before the moment at which the new representation starts,
it gets mashed by the hot potato doctrine.45  If it withdraws with cause 
just before the new representation starts, it is in the clear even though the 
impact on all concerned is identical.  It is not clear that courts will stick
with such a rigid rule or that they should do so.  And one can expect the 
old client and the firm to dispute the precise moment at which the old
representation ended. 
Even if a firm manages to consummate its withdrawal from one 
representation before formally instituting another, there will still in many 
cases be an intermediate period posing all the dangers against which the 
concurrent representation rule guards.  The firm may put off its official
acceptance of the new client, but it fully expects to represent that client 
and therefore takes its interests into account.46  Meanwhile, it will hasten 
to finish its work for the old client, perhaps urging a quick settlement,
delaying new initiatives, trying to collect its fees, seeking that client’s
consent for it to withdraw, or establishing good grounds for
withdrawal.47  Whatever the formalities, in reality there will often be
what amounts to concurrent representation of two parties whose interests 
conflict.  In such situations, there is little reason to exempt the firm
entirely from the hot potato doctrine. 
A final but less serious difficulty with allowing a firm to withdraw for 
cause from one representation before starting a new one is that it 
44. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., supra note 42, § 20.10, at 20-26 (Supp. 2010).  Model 
Rule 1.16 allows withdrawal even if the client is harmed, unless withdrawal is based on 
the ground that there will be no “material adverse effect on the interests of the client.” 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16(b)(1).  The Restatement of the Law 
Governing Lawyers, by contrast, forbids withdrawal “if the harm that withdrawal would 
cause significantly exceeds the harm to the lawyer or others in not withdrawing.”
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 32(4) (2000).  But even
under this provision, harm to the client does not necessarily bar withdrawal. See id.
45. See, e.g., Stratagem Dev. Corp. v. Heron Int’l N.V., 756 F. Supp. 789 
(S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
46. See SHAPIRO, supra note 13, at 189–90 (describing such delaying practices). 
47. See Wong v. Fong, 593 P.2d 386 (Haw. 1979) (settling of one case after 
disqualification order in second case made disqualification unnecessary).
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encourages firms to claim cause for withdrawal on flimsy grounds.  The 
withdrawal rules allow a firm to end a representation if that will not 
harm the client, even if there is no other basis for withdrawal.48 And 
even if the client will be harmed, the firm may withdraw on fuzzy
grounds such as fundamental disagreement, unreasonable financial
burden on the lawyer, or client behavior making the representation
unreasonably difficult.49 
It is doubtful, however, that tinkering with the hot potato doctrine will 
remedy the defects of the withdrawal rule.  To the extent that the rule 
makes withdrawal too easy, it is the rule that needs remodeling, and 
fixing it would also remedy the many situations in which the hot potato 
doctrine does not apply.  Indeed, cooked-up grounds for withdrawal may
be less of a problem in hot potato cases than elsewhere: the doctrine is 
almost always invoked in a contested motion to disqualify counsel, and 
the court will then look into whether the firm’s claim of cause to
withdraw is borne out by the facts.  A firm whose asserted cause to
withdraw from one representation appears just after the firm is offered
another inconsistent representation will be met with skepticism even by
a court recognizing that lawyer cupidity is not in itself a ground for 
disqualification.  That skepticism is appropriate and should foil fudged 
claims that firms are entitled to withdraw. 
In short, I think that it often makes sense to allow a firm having cause 
to withdraw from a representation to do so and then accept a new and
inconsistent representation.  But when the deserted client seeks to 
disqualify the firm from the new representation, courts should appraise 
with care whether there really was cause to withdraw.  And in
considering whether withdrawal preceded the new representation, courts 
should look beyond formalities to determine whether the firm was 
involved with both clients simultaneously for a significant period.  If so, 
the usual version of the hot potato doctrine should apply.
B.  What if the Protesting Client Discharges the Firm? 
There is some authority that, if the old client discharges the firm
engaged in conflicting concurrent representations, the hot potato 
doctrine does not apply, and the firm is subject only to the less 
48. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16(b)(1).  For a discussion of what 
should count as harm to the client, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING 
LAWYERS § 32 cmt. h(ii) (2000). 
49. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16(b)(4), (6).  For attempts to limit 
such provisions, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 32 
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constraining rule governing former clients.50  After all, the firm has not
dropped its client like a hot potato.  Rather, the client itself chose to
jump back into the pot.  By its own doing, the problems of concurrent 
representation have ended.  Now that the client no longer faces such
problems, why should it be permitted to prevent its former lawyer from 
opposing it in an unrelated case?  Doing so would burden its opponent in 
that case and is probably being sought for precisely that reason. 
Yet equal and opposite authority favors the contrary position that the 
firm continues to be barred from opposing its client even though that
client has discharged it.51  “Otherwise, counsel could simply persist in 
dual representation until one client or the other capitulates.  Counsel
should not be rewarded for delaying resolution of a conflict issue by
being accorded a less demanding disqualification standard.”52  Before its
discharge, the firm violated the concurrent representation rule, 
misconduct that stands in need of deterrence.  By seeking new counsel,
its former client was simply protecting itself against the dangers of 
concurrent representation to which the firm wrongly exposed it, in the 
process bearing the further burdens of changing its lawyers.  The
concurrent representation rule gives it two rights: the right to retain its 
old firm in the absence of grounds for withdrawal and the right to
prevent that firm from representing an opponent.  It has abandoned the 
first right but still, in the absence of its own informed consent, retains 
the second one.53 
Reconciling these concerns and arguments is not easy.  Looking at the 
situation ex post—as it confronts the court deciding a motion to
disqualify—it is hard to see that disqualification will prevent any real
dangers.  What it will do is to impose costs, both on the disqualified firm
50. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Vidalakis, No. 07-0039, 2007 WL 4468688 
(W.D. Ark. Dec. 17, 2007); Coke v. Equity Residential Props. Trust, 800 N.E.2d 280
(Mass. 2003); ROTUNDA & DZIENKOWSKI, supra note 9, at 343; see also Wong, 593 P.2d 
386 (settling of one case, pending disqualification proceedings in second case, ended
concurrent representation problem). 
51. See, e.g., Merck Eprova AG v. ProThera, Inc., 670 F. Supp. 2d 201 (S.D.N.Y.
2009); Ransburg Corp. v. Champion Spark Plug Co., 648 F. Supp. 1040 (N.D. Ill. 1986);
Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 435 F. Supp. 84, 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), 
aff’d in relevant part, 567 F.2d 225 (2d Cir. 1977). 
52. Merck, 670 F. Supp. 2d at 209. 
53. Compare In re Sandahl, 980 F.2d 1118 (7th Cir. 1992) (client consented), and 
Unified Sewerage Agency v. Jelco Inc., 646 F.2d 1339 (9th Cir. 1981) (similar), with
Fla. Ins. Guar. Ass’n v. Carey Can., Inc., 749 F. Supp. 255 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (any consent


























   
and on its more or less innocent new client.54  Looking ex ante—at firms
deciding whether to accept new clients—the prospect of disqualification 
from the new representation even should their old client discharge them
will exercise a wholesome deterrent effect.  Such firms will be more 
likely to conduct adequate conflicts checks, seek informed consent from 
clients, and in its absence decline improper representations.  As a result, 
fewer disqualification motions will be needed.  Yet there is also a more 
dubious incentive: a flat disqualification rule will encourage clients to
turn the hot potato doctrine into the hot potato game, seeking to
manipulate the situation so as to impose an expensive disqualification on
an opposing party.
On the whole, it seems to me that the ex post attitude is the more 
appropriate one for a court considering a motion to disqualify and that 
there should therefore be a presumption that the old client’s discharge of 
the firm frees the firm to represent the new client.  The increasing
tendency to recognize that, even in the face of a clear professional 
violation, courts have discretion not to require disqualification shows 
that deterrence should not be increased indefinitely.55  For that matter, 
deterrence can also be provided by professional discipline,56 court
sanctions other than disqualification,57 malpractice liability,58 and 
attorney fee forfeiture.59  More basically, a court should not be placed in
the position of having no choice but to help the old client harm the new 
54. An innocent client may be able to recover its costs from the offending firm, or
at least avoid paying that firm for its services. See infra notes 58–59.
55. See supra note 23; infra Part IV. 
56. See, e.g., In re Johnson, 2004 MT 6, 319 Mont. 188, 84 P.3d 637 (discipline 
for hot potato violation); see also Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Winkel, 599 N.W.2d 
456 (Iowa 1999) (similar). 
57. See 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2006) (stating that lawyers who multiply proceedings 
unreasonably and vexatiously may be held liable for resulting expenses and attorney
fees).  Compare Sanford v. Virginia, 689 F. Supp. 2d 802 (E.D. Va. 2010) (declining to 
sanction disqualified lawyer), with United States v. Associated Convalescent Enters., 766 
F.2d 1342 (9th Cir. 1985) (sanctioning lawyer who failed to disclose that he would be 
witness).
58. See, e.g., Airgas, Inc. v. Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP, No. 10-612 (E.D. Pa.
Aug. 3, 2010) (breach of fiduciary duty claim); Andre v. Golden, 750 So. 2d 1101 (La.
Ct. App. 1999) (stating statute of limitations barred claim against lawyer who
represented plaintiff in suit against parish for which he was district attorney); Conoco, 
Inc. v. Baskin, 803 S.W.2d 416, 422 (Tex. App. 1991) (noting possible damages 
remedy).
59. See, e.g., City of Little Rock v. Cash, 644 S.W.2d 229 (Ark. 1982) (holding
that plaintiff’s lawyer, who also represented defendant in other matters, was not entitled 
to statutory fee award), overruled in part, T&T Chem. v. Priest, 95 S.W.3d 750 (Ark.
2003); Jeffry v. Pounds, 136 Cal. Rptr. 373 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977) (upholding fee forfeiture 
when firm representing client in personal injury suit represented client’s wife in divorce).  























    
 
  
[VOL. 48:  251, 2011] Conflicts of Interest
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
client for its own strategic benefit after the old client has brought to an 
end the representation protected by the concurrent representation rule. 
Nevertheless, there may be situations in which the circumstances rebut 
the presumption against disqualification even after the old client has
discharged the firm.  Suppose, for example, that disqualification would
not significantly harm the new client, which already has another firm on 
the job; that the new client was aware of the concurrent representation 
problem when it retained the firm; that the firm did its best or worst to
keep the concurrent representation going as long as possible, for 
example, by not making prompt disclosure to the old client; and that the 
firm’s untrustworthy behavior left the old client with little choice but to 
discharge it.  In such a case, and even in some not going that far,
disqualification will not harm the innocent new client and will be an
appropriate sanction for exacerbated impropriety. 
C.  What if the Firm Did Not Cause the Conflict? 
A number of cases concern conflicts of interest caused by a corporate
client’s merger after two representations, each entirely proper when 
commenced, are under way.60  This has given rise to what is called, in a 
concatenation of jargon, the “thrust upon” exception to the hot potato
doctrine.61 
Again a paradigm example will clarify the exception and its reasons. 
Firm represents Spudco in its suit against Boiler, Inc.  It also represents 
Fryer, Ltd. in entirely unrelated matters.  During the suit, Fryer and
Boiler decide to negotiate a merger, which is then consummated.62 Now 
60. See, e.g., Installation Software Techs., Inc. v. Wise Solutions, Inc., No. 03 C 
4502, 2004 WL 524829 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 2, 2004); Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & 
Co., No. 00-CV-6161L(B), 2000 WL 1922271 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2000), aff’d, 358
F.3d 919 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Carlyle Towers Condo. Ass’n v. Crossland Sav., FSB, 944 F. 
Supp. 341 (D.N.J. 1996); Gould, Inc. v. Mitsui Mining & Smelting Co., 738 F. Supp.
1121 (N.D. Ohio 1990); Pennwalt Corp. v. Plough, Inc., 85 F.R.D. 264 (D. Del. 1980); 
see also D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 272 (1997), available at http://www. 
dcbar.org/for_lawyers/ethics/legal_ethics/opinions/opinion272.cfm; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 128 illus. 4 (2000). 
61. See Ass’n of the Bar of the City of New York, Comm. on Prof’l & Judicial
Ethics, Formal Op. 2005-05 (2005) [hereinafter ABCNY, Comm. on Prof’l & Judicial 
Ethics], reprinted in 61 REC. ASS’N B. CITY N.Y. 102 (2006); ROTUNDA & DZIENKOWSKI, 
supra note 9, at 343; Charles W. Wolfram, Ethics 2000 and Conflicts of Interest: The
More Things Change . . . ., 70 TENN. L. REV. 27, 36–37 (2002). 
62. I specify a full-fledged merger to avoid any argument that Fryer and Boiler 


























Firm is representing Spudco in a suit against the merged corporation,
which it continues to represent in other matters.  It is hence violating the 
concurrent representation rule.63  Spudco gladly consents to the concurrent
representation.  But the merged Fryer-Boiler corporation declines to give 
informed consent and takes the opportunity to demand that Firm 
withdraw from the Spudco representation. 
The merged corporation cannot argue that any confidential information is
at stake—the matters in question being unrelated—or that Firm has any
interest in representing it badly in order to curry favor with Spudco— 
there is no way in which any such bad representation could benefit 
Spudco.  The merged corporation can, however, say that representation
by a firm that is simultaneously scheming against it in another matter 
deprives it of the trust it is entitled to feel in its lawyers.64 
In such situations, the authorities rely on the thrust upon exception to 
reject the claim of the merged corporation that it is entitled to disqualify
Firm from representing its adversary.65  Firm did nothing wrong in
accepting either client because it did so at a time when neither of its
representations caused it to oppose another Firm client.  Nor did Firm do 
anything to bring about the subsequent adversity, which resulted entirely 
from the unforeseen decision of Boiler and Fryer to merge.  Because the
hot potato doctrine’s central purpose is to sanction firms that seek to 
accept new representations inconsistent with existing representations,
that doctrine should have no application here.66 Nor should the merged
corporation be able to use its own act creating the conflict to impose 
expense and delay on its adversary, Spudco, by forcing it to switch
counsel in midsuit.
But this is the easy part; the difficulty is to say what rule should 
replace the hot potato doctrine’s rigor.  Under the D.C. Rules of 
Professional Conduct, Firm would be free to continue with both
representations, assuming that the conflict was not reasonably foreseeable 
when representation started and that the concurrent representation does
not violate another rule.67 If either client objects, it is free to discharge 
Firm and find other representation but not to insist that Firm withdraw 
from representing its adversary.68  Other authorities require Firm to end 
interest purposes.  For the dispute as to whether and when it should matter that such 
transactions result not in a single corporation but in a wholly owned subsidiary and its 
parent, see infra Part IV(B)(5). 
63. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a)(1) (2010). 
64. For these arguments, see supra text accompanying notes 33–35. 
65. See supra notes 60–61. 
66. See supra Part II(B). 
67. See D.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(d) (2010). 
68. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 31(2)(a), 
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the conflict but allow it to choose whether to do so by withdrawing from 
the Spudco suit or by dropping the merged corporation—like a hot
potato or otherwise—and continuing to represent Spudco in its suit
against that corporation.69 More cagily, a comment to the ABA Model
Rules says that “[d]epending on the circumstances, the lawyer may have
the option to withdraw from one of the representations” without saying
when that is so.70  After balancing relevant factors, courts have usually 
accepted the firm’s decision to drop the merged corporation in order to 
continue the suit against it on behalf of Spudco.71  But there is also 
authority indicating Firm has no choice and must drop the merged
corporation.72 
In my opinion, Firm should not be able to continue both representations,
absent informed consent or court approval.  Representing both clients 
violates the concurrent representation rule intended to protect the clients, 
and that remains so even if the concurrent representation came about 
without any sin by Firm. Granted that one representation must end, and
assuming that the parties cannot agree which one that should be, the 
decision falls in the first instance on Firm, which should take into
account all the relevant factors and especially the impact of withdrawal 
on each representation.73  In the paradigm case being considered, court
approval will also be needed, either because the merged corporation
seeks to disqualify Firm from representing Spudco or because Firm
seeks leave to withdraw from that representation.  At this point, judicial
discretion comes into play, in ways to be discussed later.74 
to obtain court approval before changing counsel.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 1.16(c) (2010); see also ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R 
1.16 cmt. (6th ed. 2007) (citing cases). 
69. See, e.g., ABCNY, Comm. on Prof’l & Judicial Ethics, supra note 61 
(providing guidance to lawyers as to which client to drop).
70. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 5 (2010). 
71. See, e.g., Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., No. 00-CV-6161L(B), 2000
WL 1922271 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2000), aff’d, 358 F.3d 916 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Carlyle 
Towers Condo. Ass’n v. Crossland Sav., FSB, 944 F. Supp. 341 (D.N.J. 1996); Gould, 
Inc. v. Mitsui Mining & Smelting Co., 738 F. Supp. 1121 (N.D. Ohio 1990); Pennwalt
Corp. v. Plough, Inc., 85 F.R.D. 264 (D. Del. 1980). 
72. See, e.g., Installation Software Techs., Inc. v. Wise Solutions, Inc., No. 03 C 
4502, 2004 WL 524829 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 2, 2004) (rejecting firm’s motion to withdraw); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 132 illus. 11 (2000) 
(illustrating that Firm must withdraw unless clients consent).  But see id. § 128 illus. 4 
(stating that Firm “might be permitted to withdraw”).
73. See ABCNY, Comm. on Prof’l & Judicial Ethics, supra note 61. 



























Once we depart from the paradigm thrust upon situation, the courts 
have in general reached results compatible with the principle that the hot
potato doctrine applies only when the firm in question has acted
wrongfully.  Thus, when acts of one client other than a corporate merger 
give rise to the conflict, courts find the conflict to have been thrust on 
the firm and do not apply the hot potato doctrine.75 On the other hand,
they do apply the doctrine when the firm should have foreseen the 
conflict76 or when it allowed the conflict to persist rather than immediately 
bringing it to the attention of both clients.77  Such behavior calls for
deterrence and unnecessarily exposes clients to the dangers of conflicting 
concurrent representations. 
Some courts apply the hot potato doctrine when a conflict results from
the firm’s acts in merging or making a lateral hire during the 
representation, but that application seems questionable.78  Mergers and 
hires are not professional misconduct, even if they do sometimes result 
75. See, e.g., Commonwealth Scientific & Indus. Research Org. v. Toshiba Am. 
Info. Sys., 297 F. App’x 970 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (involving client A who disclosed 
agreement that it would indemnify defendant that firm was suing for client B); Bd. of 
Regents of the Univ. of Neb. v. BASF Corp., No. 4:04CV3356, 2006 WL 2385363 (D.
Neb. Aug. 17, 2006) (involving client A who disclosed its claim to an exclusive license
to the technology in dispute in the suit in which firm represented client B); AmSouth 
Bank, N.A. v. Drummond Co., 589 So. 2d 715 (Ala. 1991) (during firm’s representation
of two clients in unrelated matters, one client sued the other in a third matter).  For a 
more questionable example, see Sabrix, Inc. v. Carolina Cas. Ins. Co., No. CV-02-1470-
HU, 2003 WL 23538035 (D. Ore. July 23, 2003) (involving a firm representing A against 
B while firm’s client in another case brought its insurer, B, into that case, and firm 
agreed to represent B as well).
76. See, e.g., El Camino Res., Ltd. v. Huntington Nat’l Bank, 623 F. Supp. 2d 863
(W.D. Mich. 2007); Philadelphia Bar Ass’n, Prof’l Guidance Comm., Op. 2009-07 
(2009), available at http://www.philadelphiabar.org/WebObjects/PBAReadOnly.woa/Contents/ 
WebServerResources/CMSResources/2009-7EthicsOpinion.pdf; Wolfram, supra note 61, at
36–37. 
77. See, e.g., Fla. Ins. Guar. Ass’n v. Carey Can., Inc., 749 F. Supp. 255 (S.D. Fla.
1990); Harte Biltmore Ltd. v. First Pa. Bank, N.A., 655 F. Supp. 419 (S.D. Fla. 1987);
see also Flying J Inc. v. TA Operating Corp., No. 1:06-CV-30 TC, 2008 WL 648545 (D. 
Utah Mar. 10, 2008) (involving firm that sought no waiver or withdrawal for a year but 
disqualification denied for other reasons). 
78. See, e.g., Harte Biltmore, 655 F. Supp. 419 (applying hot potato doctrine when
conflict was not detected at time of law firm merger because client’s name was 
misspelled). Compare Picker Int’l, Inc. v. Varian Assocs., 670 F. Supp. 1363 (N.D. 
Ohio 1987) (coining the hot potato simile and applying the doctrine when the conflict 
resulted from a law firm merger), and Qwest Corp. v. Anovian, Inc., No. C08-1715RSM,
2010 WL 1440765 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 8, 2010) (requiring disqualification when lawyers
switched firms), with Pamlab, L.L.C. v. Hi-Tech Pharmacal Co., No. 08-cv-00967-REB-
BNB, 2009 WL 77527 (D. Colo. Jan. 9, 2009) (relying, inter alia, on conclusion that 
lawyer’s primary motive in shifting firms was not to represent new client), and
Monaghan v. SZS 33 Assocs., No. 89 Civ. 4900 (RWS), 1994 WL 623185 (S.D.N.Y. 
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in conflicts of interest, always provided that the firm acts promptly to 
resolve the conflict.79 
Although the thrust upon exception is usually discussed in connection 
with the hot potato doctrine, similar situations arise whenever
developments for which a firm is not to blame cause a conflict of interest
to arise during a representation.  For example, a firm preparing wills for 
a husband and wife might learn that the husband had an illegitimate 
child with another woman, giving the spouses conflicting interests.80 
Developments during a case may create conflicts81 or may cause a 
representation to become adverse to a former client.82  Each of these 
situations challenges the court to enforce basic professional requirements
while avoiding needless disruption of representations that were started
without any impropriety.  The effect of the thrust upon principle is to 
free courts and lawyers to do this unconstrained by the more punitive 
approach that is applied when wrongdoing by the lawyers helps to create 
the conflict. 
IV. WHAT IS TO BE DONE? 
The actual impact of the hot potato doctrine is more limited than 
might be expected from the assertion that “a firm may not drop a client 
like a hot potato.”83  When a case falls within the doctrine and is not 
excluded by any of the principles discussed in the previous section, just 
two things follow.  First, the case must be appraised under the
professional rules governing concurrent client conflicts, not those 
79. This analysis does not apply, for example, when a lateral hire or merger is
tantamount to entering into a forbidden representation because the main case that a 
lateral brings to the new firm conflicts with one of the firm’s existing representations. 
80. See, e.g., A. v. B., 726 A.2d 924 (N.J. 1999) (holding that firm could share
information with wife).
81. See, e.g., Whiting v. Lacara, 187 F.3d 317, 322–23 (2d Cir. 1999) (involving
client who threatened to sue lawyer); Fiandaca v. Cunningham, 827 F.2d 825 (1st Cir. 
1987) (involving defendant who proposed relief that would benefit plaintiff class at the 
expense of another class that the same lawyers represented in another suit); ABA Comm.
on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 94-384 (1994) (opposing party files 
grievance against lawyer); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS
§ 132 illus. 6 (2000) (opposing party unexpectedly calls lawyer’s former client as witness). 
82. See, e.g., SuperGuide Corp. v. DirecTV Enters., 141 F. Supp. 2d 616 
(W.D.N.C. 2001) (involving defendant that impleaded party that firm representing
plaintiff had formerly represented in related matter).
83. Picker Int’l, 670 F. Supp. at 1365. 
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governing past client conflicts.84  Second, any attempt by the law firm in 
question to continue representing its new client without informed consent 
will be met with judicial suspicion and very likely a disqualification 
order. 
But there is a gap between “very likely” and “always” that leaves open 
two questions: who is to decide whether the presumption of
disqualification should be overridden, and what standards should govern 
that decision?  Just as finding that a conflict was “thrust upon” the firm
and not its fault does not tell us which representation should be dropped, 
finding that a firm has violated the hot potato doctrine does not tell us 
what should happen next.85 
A.  Judicial Discretion and Its Alternatives 
Although there have been suggestions that, granted a concurrent client
conflict, the firm must withdraw from both representations, that makes
sense only in a limited class of situations, those in which the concurrent
representations are related.86  When the representations are related, the
firm may be assumed to have received confidential information in each
representation that could be used in the other, and the past client rules 
therefore forbid the firm from representing either client even after it
drops the other one.87 
When the representations are not related in this sense, forbidding both 
of them simply doubles the pain inflicted on clients by rules intended to
protect them.  Once one representation ends, the problems raised by
concurrent representations also end, and if the representations are
unrelated, then the problems raised by successive representations are
also absent.  Double disqualification would indeed be a powerful 
deterrent for law firms, but the collateral harm it inflicts is unacceptable.
Even if it were necessary to sanction a firm by denying it the benefit of
84. See supra Part II. 
85. See supra text accompanying notes 67–72. 
86. The results in some cases are consistent with this view.  See, e.g., Stratagem 
Dev. Corp. v. Heron Int’l N.V., 756 F. Supp. 789 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); In re Grieb Printing
Co., 297 B.R. 82, 89 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 2003); Margulies v. Upchurch, 696 P.2d 1195
(Utah 1985); see also ROTUNDA & DZIENKOWSKI, supra note 9, at 339 (“Absent special 
circumstances, if the parties do not consent to the conflict, the law firm must withdraw 
from representing both parties in the two cases.” (footnote omitted)).  But see  MODEL 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 4 (2010) (“Where more than one client is involved, 
whether the lawyer may continue to represent any of the clients is determined both by
the lawyer’s ability to comply with duties owed to the former client and by the lawyer’s
ability to represent adequately the remaining client or clients, given the lawyer’s duties 
to the former client.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 121
cmt. e (2000) (discussing appropriateness of withdrawal in different conflicts situations). 
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both representations, that could be accomplished by ordering the firm— 
those involved in hot potato cases are typically large and wealthy—to 
stay in one case but serve without pay.88 
Another clear, simple, and unacceptable rule is suggested by the
language of some courts: the firm may not drop its old client—that being 
precisely what the hot potato doctrine is supposed to forbid—and must 
therefore drop the new client, absent informed consent or grounds that
would warrant withdrawing from the old representation even in the 
absence of a conflict of interest.89  Such a requirement would deter firms 
from undertaking the new representation, ensure that improper concurrent 
representations would be ended, and discourage wasteful litigation over 
the appropriateness of disqualification.  But as we shall see, hot potato 
cases differ among themselves in relevant ways that focusing on a 
paradigm case can obscure, and in some cases numerous practical
concerns can cut against disqualification.90 
Granting that some kind of case-by-case approach will therefore be 
desirable, entrusting it to the firm in question has the obvious flaw that 
the firm has just demonstrated poor judgment, if not worse, by accepting 
two clients in violation of the concurrent representation rule, and then 
jettisoning the older client in defiance of the hot potato doctrine. 
Nevertheless, some initial decision by the firm seems unavoidable, if 
only because client objections will usually be presented to the firm
before they are submitted to the court.  Sometimes, indeed, they will
never reach the court, either because the parties and firm reach
agreement on a resolution, or because the conflict does not involve a 
case in litigation and no one chooses to bear the burden of initiating a 
court proceeding.  And sometimes the firm’s decision seems untainted 
by past mistakes or present self-interest.91 
88. See Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 536 A.2d 243, 251–53 (N.J. 1988) 
(imposing this sanction).  For other possible sanctions, see supra text accompanying notes
56–59.
89. See, e.g., Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp. v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271 (3d Cir. 1978); Truck
Ins. Exch. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 228 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).  On
other grounds for withdrawal, see supra text accompanying notes 40, 43.  In support of 
automatic disqualification for violations of conflicts rules, see, for example, In re Am.  
Airlines, Inc., 972 F.2d 605, 609–12 (5th Cir. 1992); ROTUNDA & DZIENKOWSKI, supra
note 9, at 506.  For contrary authority, see infra notes 93–96.
90. See infra Part IV(B). 




















    
 
 
    
    
 
   
 
      
 
Setting aside the possibilities of decision by a simple and unbending
rule, or by the law firm whose conduct is in question, leaves it to the 
court before which one of the conflicting representations is pending to 
decide which client should be dropped.  The contending clients can
present the relevant facts and arguments to the court, which can then
render a speedy decision.  That is not true of the disciplinary authorities,
which are much slower and rarely sanction the large-firm lawyers in 
complex and disputed factual situations who are involved in most
reported hot potato cases.92 
Several lines of argument support the discretion of a court confronting
a hot potato problem to balance all the relevant factors in deciding which
representation the offending firm should drop.  When a party to a case or
intervenor moves to disqualify its lawyer or former lawyer from 
continuing its representation of another party, there is substantial 
authority that even a clear violation of a professional rule does not 
necessarily require disqualification.93  Likewise, if a lawyer seeks to 
withdraw from a pending court representation, the court has discretion in 
deciding whether to allow withdrawal.94 
Furthermore, the hot potato doctrine is not a rule embodied in fixed
language that a court may not inflect. It is a court-created doctrine based
on ethical and policy concerns, and courts should be free to deny
disqualification when in particular circumstances those concerns are
outweighed by others.  Indeed, hot potato cases by definition involve 
two unrelated representations, and because the arguments for applying 
the concurrent representation rule to such cases are often weak to begin 
with, courts should exercise a broader discretion to withhold disqualification 
than they would in other situations.95  For one or another of these 
92. On the proper role of courts in disqualification cases, compare Bruce A. Green,
Conflicts of Interest in Litigation: The Judicial Role, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 71 (1996), 
with Susan R. Martyn, Developing the Judicial Role in Controlling Litigation Conflicts: 
Response to Green, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 131 (1996). 
93. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 624 F.2d 1198, 1201 (3d Cir. 1980); Bd. of
Educ. v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1245–46 (2d Cir. 1979); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE 
LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 6 cmt. i & reporter’s note (2000); supra note 17; see also
Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 163–64 (1988) (stating that the court has discretion to
require disqualification even though criminal defendants affected by conflict consent).  
For authority supporting a more automatic disqualification rule, see supra note 89.
94. See, e.g., Patterson v. Gemini Org., Ltd., No. 99-1537, 2000 WL 1718542 (4th 
Cir. Nov. 17, 2000); Whiting v. Lacara, 187 F.3d 317, 320–21 (2d Cir. 1999); 
ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16 cmt., at 247–48 (6th ed. 2007). 
95. See Morgan, supra note 7.  Of course many people reject Morgan’s critique.
My own view is that being sued by “one’s own lawyer” in an unrelated matter is painful 
but rarely imposes improper burdens on the client. Normally, therefore, I would not allow the
client in that situation to object.  On the other hand, being represented by a lawyer who 



















[VOL. 48:  251, 2011] Conflicts of Interest
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
reasons, there is significant authority upholding the discretionary 
approach in hot potato cases.96 
B.  What Courts Should Consider in Exercising Discretion 
Courts exercising discretion in hot potato cases typically rely on 
obvious practical concerns relating to the speedy and economical 
resolution of the cases before them.  Sometimes circumstances that
should be considered in deciding whether a firm has behaved improperly
reappear with questionable appropriateness as part of a conglomerate 
discretionary decision.  And sometimes courts stir into the stew factors
that are equally present in other kinds of cases and should ordinarily be 
treated by more general rules.  I will discuss instances of these phenomena 
here without claiming to cover all of them or to lay down a general 
standard for the exercise of discretion. 
1. Balancing Client Burdens 
Because the conflict of interest rules are meant to protect clients, it
makes sense to relax their application, even at the cost of some
deterrence of future violations, when they would seriously injure clients. 
So courts are less willing to disqualify counsel when the suit is already
well advanced97 and bringing in new counsel would consume time and
money98 than when that is not the case.  And they are more willing to 
disqualify when the client to be bereaved already had another firm on the 
faint-hearted representation and should be permissible only with the client’s informed
consent. 
96. See, e.g., Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., No. 06 C 5812, 2009 
WL 1439717 (N.D. Ill. May 18, 2009); Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Neb. v. BASF 
Corp., No. 4:04CV3356, 2006 WL 2385363 (D. Neb. Aug. 17, 2006); Eastman Kodak 
Co. v. Sony Corp., No. 04-CV-6095, 04-CV-6098, 2004 WL 2984297 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 
27, 2004); Research Corp. Techs., Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 936 F. Supp. 697, 701–
03 (D. Ariz. 1996); SWS Fin. Fund A v. Salomon Bros., 790 F. Supp. 1392 (N.D. Ill. 
1992). 
97. See, e.g., Eastman Kodak, 2004 WL 2984297; Universal City Studios, Inc. v. 
Reimerdes, 98 F. Supp. 2d 449, 456 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Hewlett-Packard, 936 F. Supp. at 
702; Carlyle Towers Condo. Ass’n v. Crossland Sav., FSB, 944 F. Supp. 341, 349
(D.N.J. 1996); Molina v. Mallah Org., 804 F. Supp. 504, 512 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). 
98. See, e.g., Installation Software Techs., Inc. v. Wise Solutions, Inc., No. 03 C 
4502, 2004 WL 524829 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 2, 2004); Gould, Inc. v. Mitsui Mining &






















     
   
 
job99 or could easily find one.100  These concerns should lie at the heart 
of the court’s consideration whether to disqualify the offending firm. 
2. Discounting or Emphasizing Client Burdens 
Sometimes a client’s own acts warrant treating less seriously its 
claims of harm.  We have seen one example of this in the thrust upon 
cases, where the concurrent representation problem is attributed to the 
client and sanctioning the firm would be inappropriate.101  But even  
when the firm has erred, courts may reject disqualification if they conclude
that a client has delayed unreasonably in reacting or is primarily
motivated by tactical advantage.102 
There is one situation in which heightened sympathy for a firm’s “new
client” may be in order because it is really an old client.  Suppose Firm
has represented FreezeFries, Inc. for many years in many matters, none
of them against FreezeFries’s competitor, HotFries, Co.  HotFries retains 
Firm for a tax matter.  Soon afterward, HotFries—using other counsel— 
sues FreezeFries, which calls on Firm to defend it.  Under the concurrent 
representation rule, Firm’s pending representation of HotFries precludes 
its accepting the case.103 
If Firm now drops HotFries without its consent, it has violated the hot
potato doctrine.  Such a withdrawal does not count for conflict of 
interest purposes and leaves Firm subject to, and in violation of, the
concurrent representation rule.  The decision that rule governs is the 
decision to accept a new representation, whether or not it involves a new 
client.  In that respect, this Article has sometimes risked being 
misleading by speaking of old and new clients, rather than old and new 
representations.  Even if Firm has long represented FreezeFries in other 
matters, it is under no professional obligation to accept a new 
representation.104  And even if it has just started representing HotFries, 
that client is entitled to have counsel not subject to perverse incentives or
grounds for legitimate distrust, such as those created by a conflicting
99. See, e.g., Salomon Bros., 790 F. Supp. 1392. 
100. See, e.g., Eaton v. Coca-Cola Co., 640 F. Supp. 2d 203 (D. Conn. 2009) 
(scoffing at Pepsi’s claim of hardship). 
101. See supra Part III(C).
102. See, e.g., Flying J Inc. v. TA Operating Corp., No. 1:06-CV-30 TC, 2008 WL 
648545 (D. Utah Mar. 10, 2008); Universal City Studios, 98 F. Supp. 2d 449. 
103. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a) (2010). 
104. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 14 cmt. b
(2000).  In England, the “Cab-Rank Rule” obliges barristers to accept clients, but the 
many exceptions include situations in which acceptance would cause a conflict of interests.
See CODE OF CONDUCT OF THE BAR OF ENGLAND AND WALES R. 602, 603(e) (8th ed.
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concurrent representation.  Only if the new case can somehow be
considered as part of a representation antedating the HotFries representation 
could this logic be avoided.
On the other hand, cases in which a firm drops a new representation 
for the sake of an old client are far from the paradigm that gave rise to 
the hot potato doctrine. That difference may help support a denial of 
disqualification.  Even if FreezeFries’s suit is a new matter, FreezeFries
may well have—depending on its outside counsel practices105— 
educated, confided its secrets to, and placed its trust in Firm over the
years.  Forcing it to turn elsewhere in its hour of need may be even more 
jarring and costly for FreezeFries than interrupting Firm’s new
representation of HotFries.  For its part, Firm may be driven less by the 
search for the most lucrative client than by a sense of loyalty to good old 
FreezeFries.  It is even possible that HotFries’s single case will earn
Firm more than all the matters it hopes to handle for FreezeFries.  In 
such a situation, requiring Firm to drop the defense of FreezeFries and
continue its representation of HotFries may not be needed as a sanction 
to prevent future offenses and may disproportionately burden
FreezeFries.
Relying on judicial discretion provides a reasonable way out of this 
dilemma.  The court can rule that a firm has indeed violated the 
concurrent representation rule by accepting a new case pitting an old 
client against a new one. At the same time, it may consider the firm’s
traditional representation of the old client as one factor, albeit not
conclusive, in assessing the harm that termination would inflict on each
client and the appropriateness of disqualification.106 
3. Reducing Client Burdens 
If an old client can be protected against the harms assumed to flow
from concurrent representation and from being dropped by a firm, there
105. See David B. Wilkins, Team of Rivals? Toward a New Model of the Corporate
Attorney-Client Relationship, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2067 (2010).  As Professor Wilkins 
explains, some corporations use many outside firms, retaining whichever one seems 
most appropriate for the matter in question.  See id. at 2085–92.  If either FreezeFries or 
HotFries does this, its claims that losing Firm’s assistance will be disruptive are less weighty.
106. See, e.g., Bayshore Ford Truck Sales, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 380 F.3d 1331 
(11th Cir. 2004); Forrest v. Baeza, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d 857 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).  But see
























   
  
 
      
 
  
is less reason to disqualify the firm from continuing to represent its new
client.  Some courts have asserted that this may be done by screening the 
firm’s lawyers involved in one representation from those involved in the 
other.107 
The logic of screens, cones of silence, ethical walls, or the like in this 
situation is dubious.  The main purpose of such arrangements is to
prevent confidential information from one representation being misused
in another one.108  But in hot potato cases there is no real danger of 
sharing confidential information because the representations in question 
are by hypothesis unrelated.109  Screening can remove one problem
invoked to justify the concurrent representation rule—the embarrassment 
for a client of consulting with a lawyer in one representation while
knowing that the lawyer represents one’s opponent in another.  And 
screening might sometimes—but by no means always or even usually— 
reduce another problem justifying the concurrent representation rule— 
the possibility that a firm would reduce the vigor of its representation 
against a client it represents in another matter for fear that it will lose the 
second representation.  In an “eat-what-you-kill” firm in which lawyer 
self-interest rules,110 confiding each representation to a separate group of
lawyers might perhaps ensure that each group would zealously pursue its 
client’s interests, heedless of the impact on the firm as a whole.  But to 
the extent that firm lawyers believe that they are involved in a common
enterprise, or are afraid of retaliation by other lawyers blaming them for 
a client’s departure, no such result will follow. 
For these reasons, I would grant little or no weight to a law firm’s
unilateral screening as a factor cutting against disqualification in a hot
potato case.  That leaves room for screening by mutual agreement, as
part of an old client’s informed consent to a firm’s undertaking a new 
representation.  There may also be other ways in which a court may
shape relief to reduce the dangers of concurrent representation.  For
example, a court might require, as a condition of denying disqualification,
107. See, e.g., Flying J Inc. v. TA Operating Corp., No. 1:06-CV-30 TC, 2008 WL 
648545 (D. Utah Mar. 10, 2008) (a hot potato case). For a similar assertion in a concurrent
representation case not involving a hot potato problem, see Wyeth v. Abbott Laboratories, 692 
F. Supp. 2d 453 (D.N.J. 2010). 
108. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.10(a)(2), 1.11(b) (2010);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 124 (2000). 
109. See Concat LP v. Unilever, PLC, 350 F. Supp. 2d 796, 821–22 (N.D. Cal. 
2004) (making this point).  If the representations were related, the new one would continue to
be barred by the former client rule even after the firm dropped its old client.  See supra
text accompanying note 24.
110. See generally MILTON C. REGAN JR., EAT WHAT YOU KILL: THE FALL OF A 
WALL STREET LAWYER (2004); Milton C. Regan, Jr., Law Firms, Competition Penalties,


















    
 
  
   
 
   
  
[VOL. 48:  251, 2011] Conflicts of Interest
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
that a firm offer a contingent fee arrangement to the client that has 
reason to fear that the firm will slack off in representing it. 
4. The Firm’s Fault 
Because disqualification is, among other things, a sanction for lawyer
misbehavior, it makes sense to consider a firm’s delay in finding111 or 
remedying112 a conflict of interest as a factor in favor of disqualifying it. 
Some courts have gone beyond this to rank the firm’s greed level, 
discussing how lucrative each of the clients in question would have 
been.113  But relying on the lucrativeness of the new representation as a 
factor affecting disqualification makes little sense.  Courts are not likely
to be very good at predicting what revenue one or another client will 
yield.  Indeed, even law firms, however avaricious in principle, may fail
in their predictions.  In any event, whether a client is likely to pay well
over the years tells one nothing about how severely loss of its lawyers’
services will hurt it now, which should be the central concern in
deciding which client should yield.  And whether a firm has exposed to a
conflict a more or less lucrative client says little about the need for
sanctions.  This is one instance in which the natural feelings of shock 
that gave rise to the hot potato doctrine have misled some judges. 
5. Quasi-Clients: Corporate Affiliates 
There has been much discussion about when a law firm representing
one corporation in a corporate family should be treated as representing
other members of that family for conflicts of interest purposes.114 
111. See, e.g., Lemelson v. Apple Computer Inc., No. CV-N-92-665-HDM (PHA),
1993 WL 556452 (D. Nev. June 2, 1993); Atl. Pac. Home Loans, Inc. v. Superior Court, 
No. D048609, 2006 WL 3616997 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 13, 2006).  But see Research Corp. 
Techs., Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 936 F. Supp. 697, 703 (D. Ariz. 1996) (dismissing
as “inadvertent” a serious failure to detect conflict). 
112. See supra note 77.
113. See, e.g., Eaton v. Coca-Cola Co., 640 F. Supp. 203 (D. Conn. 2009)
(comparing Coke and Pepsi); Santacroce v. Neff, 134 F. Supp. 2d 366, 371 (D.N.J. 2001) 
(involving firm that preferred “the extraordinarily more remunerative client”); Apple 
Computer, 1993 WL 556452 (discussing individual client’s wealth and litigativeness); 
Unanue v. Unanue, No. Civ. 204-N, 2004 WL 602096 (Del. Ch. Mar. 25, 2004)
(contrasting this case to those in which lawyer drops small client for large one).
114. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-390 
(1995); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 121 cmt. d (2000);


























Suffice it to say that, when it comes to concurrent client conflicts, courts 
are likely to treat as identical a corporation and its wholly owned
subsidiary when they share in-house counsel and officers,115 or when a 
judgment against the subsidiary would have a substantial financial 
impact on the parent.116  One case treating this issue in the hot potato 
doctrine follows a similar approach,117 while two older decisions simply
treat parents and subsidiaries as identical without considering the
circumstances.118 
Should a court considering a hot potato case in which a firm
represented one member of a corporate family but another member seeks
disqualification consider that circumstance in deciding whether to 
exercise its discretion to deny disqualification?  The question does not 
arise if the court concludes that the two corporations should be 
considered separate because that conclusion leads to a holding that there
was no violation of the concurrent representation rules and hence no 
claim for disqualification calling for the exercise of judicial discretion. 
But if the court treats the corporations as one and finds a violation, the 
firm and its preferred client can still assert that the violation verged on 
the merely technical.  It can argue that the harms threatened by the
conflict are diluted by the fact that the suit in which disqualification is 
sought involves one corporation while the firm has represented only its 
parent or subsidiary.  Indeed, two courts finding a violation in
circumstances like these have nevertheless withheld disqualification 
because, among other reasons, the complaining client was not really 
harmed by the concurrent representations.119 
Families, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 655 (1997); Charles W. Wolfram, Corporate-Family 
Conflicts, 2 J. INST. FOR STUDY LEGAL ETHICS 295 (1999). 
115. See, e.g., GSI Commerce Solutions, Inc. v. BabyCenter, L.L.C., 618 F.3d 204 
(2d Cir. 2010); Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. Philips Lumileds Lighting Co., No. 2:07-CV-
463-CE, 2009 WL 256831 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 6, 2009). 
116. See, e.g., Cliffs Sales Co. v. Am. S.S. Co., No. 1:07-CV-485, 2007 WL
2907323 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 4, 2007); see generally Wolfram, supra note 61, at 52–53.
Sometimes both factors mentioned in the text are present and support disqualification.
See, e.g., Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 264 F. Supp. 2d 
914 (N.D. Cal. 2003); JPMorgan Chase Bank v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 189 F. Supp. 2d 
20 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
117. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Sony Corp., No. 04-CV-6095, 04-CV-6098, 2004
WL 2984297 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 27, 2004) (treating parent and subsidiary sharing legal 
department and officers as one).
118. See Stratagem Dev. Corp. v. Heron Int’l N.V., 756 F. Supp. 789 (S.D.N.Y. 
1991); Gould, Inc. v. Mitsui Mining & Smelting Co., 738 F. Supp. 1121, 1125–26 (N.D.
Ohio 1990). 
119. See Carlyle Towers Condo. Ass’n v. Crossland Sav., FSB, 944 F. Supp. 341, 
349 (D.N.J. 1996); Gould, 738 F. Supp. 1121; see also Cliffs Sales, 2007 WL 2907323 
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I would reject reliance on this factor to cut against disqualification in 
cases in which the court’s decision to treat two corporations as one was
based, as it should be, on a showing that the corporations share counsel 
and management, or that a decision harming one will significantly harm 
the other as well.120  That showing imports a finding that the dangers of
concurrent representation will indeed be present despite the split in
corporate form.  Allowing a challenge to that finding as a reason to deny 
disqualification stirs together two bodies of professional responsibility
law—the hot potato doctrine and the corporate-family decisions—each
of which is already more than sufficiently confusing. 
But I would reach a different result if the court is one of those that
amalgamates parent and subsidiary, not on the basis of specific findings
that establish a danger warranting application of the concurrent
representation rule, but because of more general evidence that a parent 
and subsidiary constitute a single economic unit, and the court’s belief 
that economic unity should normally make the two corporations a single 
unit when the conflict of interest rules are applied.121  This approach
scarcely consists with our usual respect for the corporate veil.122  And a
finding of corporate identity without a substantial showing that the 
circumstances justifying the concurrent representation rule are present
fails to provide an adequate basis for applying that rule without 
exception.  The opposing party and the law firm in question should
therefore be free to contend that, because of the corporate split and the 
circumstances associated with it, harm is not likely enough to warrant
disqualification.
6. Quasi-Clients: Accommodation Clients 
A similar problem concerns the argument that disqualification is not 
required because one of the concurrent clients is a mere “accommodation”
client: 
120. See supra notes 115–17.
121. See, e.g., Discotrade Ltd. v. Wyeth-Ayerst Int’l, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 2d 355, 358–59 
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (treating two corporations as one on basis of a somewhat general 
showing); Gen-Cor, LLC v. Buckeye Corrugated, Inc., 111 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1053 (S.D. 
Ind. 2000); Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., No. 00-CV-6161L(B), 2000 WL 
1922271 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2000); ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, 
supra note 114; supra note 118. 
122. See Rotunda, supra note 114.
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With the informed consent of each client . . . a lawyer might undertake representation
of another client as an accommodation to the lawyer’s regular client, typically
for a limited purpose in order to avoid duplication of services and consequent
higher fees.  If adverse interests later develop between the clients, even if the
adversity relates to the matter involved in the common representation, circumstances 
might warrant the inference that the “accommodation” client understood and
impliedly consented to the lawyer’s continuing to represent the regular client in
the matter.123 
Courts have sometimes treated accommodation clients as having 
implicitly waived their right to object to the joint lawyer’s representing 
the main client against them, but such rulings have also been criticized
as weakening the standards for informed consent to a conflict of
interest.124  Parties in hot potato cases have also raised accommodation 
client arguments, with mixed success.125 
In this situation, I can see no reason to rely on accommodation client 
claims as a factor bearing on the court’s discretion not to disqualify.126 
The meaning of being an accommodation is that the client has implicitly
but validly consented to its lawyer’s accepting certain representations 
that conflict of interest rules would otherwise forbid.  If the challenged 
representation is one of those consented to, it is of course permissible, 
and there is no occasion to disqualify the firm in question.  If the 
representation does not fall within the client’s consent, its having been 
an accommodation client that consented to other representations is
simply irrelevant to the representation in question.  True, questions may
be raised as to the scope of the client’s consent, but these should be 
resolved on their merits, not used to garnish the hot potato doctrine. 
Discretion is often a fine thing, but care must be taken that it is not 
rendered incoherent and arbitrary by the invocation of concerns more 
properly treated elsewhere.
 123. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 132 cmt. i (2000). 
The leading case is Allegaert v. Perot, 565 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1977). 
124. See Douglas R. Richmond, Accommodation Clients, 35 AKRON L. REV. 59 
(2001).  For cases applying or rejecting the doctrine, see FLAMM, supra note 23, § 10.6. 
125. See Sabrix, Inc. v. Carolina Cas. Ins. Co., No. CV-02-1470-HU, 2003 WL
23538035 (D. Ore. July 23, 2003) (involving facts that raised an accommodation client
problem, but the court denied disqualification without mentioning this).  Compare G.D.
Searle & Co., 2000 WL 1922271 (holding that party seeking disqualification was
accommodation client is one factor supporting denial of disqualification), with Universal 
City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 98 F. Supp. 2d 449 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that client
was not accommodation client, and even had it been, that would not justify firm’s
withdrawal).
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The hot potato doctrine turns out to have several layers.  On the 
outside, we find an expression of outrage against lawyers who abandon 
one client for another.  Peeling this away, we reach what purports to be a 
precise rule stating that firms who drop clients without cause will be 
treated for conflict of interest purposes as though they had not done so. 
The rule thus completes the formal structure of the Model Rules, stating
when the concurrent representation rule127 will apply and eliminating the
perverse incentives for lawyers created by the difference between that 
rule and the former client rule.128  That appears to be the meat of the
doctrine, but probing deeper we find a large and mushy core, in which 
courts frequently let the doctrine remain unenforced by exercising their 
discretion to deny disqualification in the light of many more or less 
relevant factors.  Here, the various problems and concerns that the 
doctrine was supposed to resolve reappear in the form of arguments for 
or against disqualification.
Do we need the hot potato doctrine?  Why not simply say that a court 
may, after considering all relevant factors, disqualify a firm that accepts 
a representation forbidden by the conflicts rules or withdraws from a 
representation without adequate grounds?129  Such a formulation would
probably work but would still leave us with most of the problems I have 
discussed here.  For example, we would still have to think about what
difference it makes if the client causes the problem by merging with 
another corporation, or if it discharges the firm rather than being 
dropped, or if the new representation is of an old client.  And of course 
we would lose a colorful simile and the opportunity for some fun.  I like 
to think that Fred Zacharias would have enjoyed that. 
 127. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a)(1) (2010). 
128. Id. R. 1.9(a). 
129. Although I refer here only to disqualification, other remedies are of course also 
available. See supra text accompanying notes 56–59.
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